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1. LIST OF PRESENTATIONS 
1. Commissioning and (early) operation - view from 
machine protection, Jan Uythoven 
2. What Systems request a Beam Dump, Jörg 
Wenninger 
3. What is required to safely fill LHC, Verena Kain 
4. What is required to get the beam safely out of LHC, 
Brennan Goddard 
5. Beam Commissioning of the Collimation Systems, 
Ralph Assmann 
6. Critical Beam Losses during Commissioning and 
Initial Operation, Guillaume Robert-Demolaize 
7. Commissioning of Beam Loss Monitors, Bernd 
Dehning 
2.  COMMISSIONING AND EARLY 
OPERATION – WHAT SYSTEMS 
REQUEST A BEAM DUMP 
Machine protection and collimation for LHC is very 
complex and a full session was therefore dedicated to its 
commissioning and early operation. The damage level for 
fast proton losses at 450 GeV is about 1-2·1012 and at 
7 TeV to about 1-2·1010. For 7 TeV, a pilot bunch is close 
to the damage limit. The proton-proton luminosity 
operation with safe beam would be limited to some 
1027 s-1 cm-2.  
A substantial part of the commissioning can already be 
done without beam during equipment tests and hardware 
commissioning.   
As for the general beam commissioning presented in 
[1], commissioning of the machine protection systems 
will take place in stages. For protection, a stage depends 
on several parameters, such as momentum, beam intensity 
and operational states. Since the stages for general 
commissioning do not have the required granularity, 
“sub”-stages are proposed: 
• first pilot with an intensity of less than 1010 protons 
• beam with 1012 protons, safe at 450 GeV 
• 43 bunches per beam 
The commissioning stages will be different for different 
types of equipment. Tables are given in [2] defining what 
protection systems are required for each stage.  
The stages and the formal acceptance of the machine 
protection systems should be defined, documented and 
approved before the tests. Corresponding procedures need 
to be written and agreed upon.  
One risk is an uncontrolled modification of critical 
parameters in the protection systems, such as thresholds 
for beam loss monitors. Direct and uncontrolled access to 
front-end crates of critical systems is not acceptable. A 
comprehensive system to manage critical settings is 
required.  
The creation of a Machine Protection Coordination 
Team is proposed, supported by many key players in 
machine protection. Such team should drive the 
formalisation of the commissioning procedures and 
validate tests together with operation. The team would be 
composed by a small team of experts, also available for 
consultation during commissioning and operation. 
3. INJECTION AND DUMPING THE 
BEAMS 
The damage limit at 450 GeV is ~ 2·1012 protons (~5 % 
of nominal full batch). Injection protection must be in 
place and working correctly when the intensity of the 
injected beam from the SPS exceeds this limit. 
Injection protection systems should be operational for 
156 on 156 with 9·1010 protons per bunch in stage I and 
therefore need commissioning at latest during operation 
with 43 on 43 bunches, to authorise starting operation 
with 156 bunches. 
According to the overall commissioning strategy for 
protons, it is mandatory to have all injection protection 
systems fully operational for commissioning stage II (936 
bunches per ring, 96 bunches maximum injected, 
maximum intensity per bunch: 9·1010 protons). 
Starting from extraction from the SPS, the injection 
protection systems that are required for the different 
stages are given in table in [3]. 
The TCLI absorbers can be commissioned later since 
these devices are only required above 50% of nominal 
injected intensity.  
Extraction of high intensity beams from the SPS and 
transport through beam-lines with tight apertures will be 
commissioned before LHC beam operation. The 
commissioning of CNGS and TI 8 with high(er) intensity 
beams are foreseen for 2006. Beams for CNGS operation 
in 2006 have more stored energy than nominal beams for 
injection into LHC. 
A sequencer will drive the LHC through various states 
to ensure safe operation. "Operational states" in the 
sequencer for the various sub-systems including the 
protection systems have to been defined (e.g. TDI "ready 
for pilot", TDI "ready for intermediate",..). Clearly the 
interplay between the various software systems such as 
sequencer, management of critical settings and software 
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interlocking plays a crucial role in guaranteeing safe 
operation and needs to be further addressed. 
The commissioning pathway for injection protection 
needs formalisation. For passive protection systems 
(beam absorbers), setting-up methods should be 
established. 
Already for operation with pilot bunches, the LHC 
Beam Dumping System should be operational to safely 
extract the protons. No beam without a functioning beam 
dumping system! There are a number of safety critical 
aspects of the Beam Dumping System, with different 
levels of criticality.  
In a first phase, many tests can be performed during 
hardware commissioning and during the reliability run 
that has been proposed. As an example, the 
interconnectivity between the subsystems and reliability 
assumptions will be validated.  
The second phase requires careful commissioning with 
pilot beam:  
• At 450 GeV in the LHC before extraction, to check 
the beam optics and aperture for the stored beam in 
the beam dumping elements 
• At 450 GeV before first ramp, to check the beam 
optics and apertures at injection energy 
• At 450 GeV to check the  “Inject & Dump” mode 
• During the ramp, to validate the energy tracking 
and other settings for the different beam energies 
• Specific checks are required when the LHC beam 
parameters change (more bunches, more intensity, 
different bunch pattern, etc.), to verify instrument 
response, diagnostics and losses 
Commissioning of the TCDQ/TCS positioning in IR6 
can be relaxed in the case of limited β squeeze and 
limited number of bunches. The beam halo load on the 
TCDQ during “minimum collimation”, see section 4, 
might lead to Q4 quenches. This issue needs further 
investigation.  
The “Inject and dump mode” should be available from 
the start and needs to be addressed. There are still many 
details to be finalised: timing, data recording, diagnostics, 
configuration management, etc. 
During stage I abort gap monitoring and cleaning could 
be important for operational efficiency, although this is 
not required for damage protection. 
4. COLLIMATION 
 
The collimation system provides several functions: 
• Beam cleaning 
• Passive machine protection 
• Background control for the particle physics 
experiments 
Each collimator scenario must be compatible with all 
three functions. 
 Based on recent simulation results, the full LHC 
collimation system of phase 1 should allow reaching 40% 
of nominal intensity. Taking into account machine 
imperfections, the cleaning efficiency could be lower by a 
factor between 2-5. 
There is a clear view on how to commission the phase 1 
collimation system with well defined priorities, based on 
performance studies. Commissioning will start from 
reduced sets of collimators and relaxed tolerances. Then 
collimator sub-systems will be added. If only cleaning 
efficiency is considered, secondary collimators could be 
delayed, but they will be used for the required passive 
protection (“safer” minimal system). 
Passive protection is not as complete as with all 
collimators at tight settings in this approach, even with 
“safer” system. The early use of W collimators simplifies 
the system but with higher sensitivity to damage (reduced 
robustness). 
Many collimators can initially be put in after the start of 
the ramp (e.g. to avoid problems during snapback), if 
controls and machine stability allows to do so safely. 
Significant risk and uncertainties in minimal approach: 
Collimator production and installation must aim at a full 
collimator complement so that we can adequately 
optimize performance, passive protection and robustness. 
There are ~40 collimators per ring for phase 1 of the 
collimation system. About 3700 Beam Loss Monitors are 
installed around the machine. Assuming that the beam 
halo is intercepted by a collimator, a limited number of 
BLMs at fixed locations are expected to always detect 
beam losses. Most of these are monitors at the collimators 
and downstream in the arc. The loss locations are fairly 
insensitive to closed orbit distortions. Some locations 
close to dipole magnets in the dispersion suppressor 
downstream of the cleaning insertion have been identified 
where additional BLMs should be positioned. 
It should be kept in mind that all results come from 
computer simulations... reality will show. 
5. BEAM LOSS MONITOR SYSTEM 
There are several steps for the commissioning of the 
Beam Loss Monitor system, starting before beam 
operation: 
• Establishing BLM thresholds to avoid quenches. A 
small safety factor is sufficient. 
• Establishing BLM thresholds to avoid damage. A 
large safety factor is required. Most monitors will 
have thresholds that are much lower, since they are 
also used to prevent quenches. The threshold for 
protection against damage must never be excceded.   
• The thresholds are loaded into the BLM 
controllers. 
• The system is validated without beam. 
The next step is after start-up LHC with beam: 
• Analysis of beam losses causing beam aborts or 
quenches to identify/verify model uncertainties 
(parasitic to operation). 
• Beam quench tests to optimise threshold tables 
(sector test will establish procedure).   
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In case of an excessive number of beam aborts or 
quenches, there must be some flexibility to change the 
thresholds of the beam loss monitors. 
Tools for analysis of beam aborts and quenches must be 
available for the start-up (logging, post mortem, etc.) 
There are about 4000 BLMs, and the threshold for each 
BLM depends on energy and on integration time. This is a 
very complex system, and the question was asked if we 
could reduce the complexity for initial operation? 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It was pointed out by several speakers that settings used 
in the machine protection systems should be well 
controlled.  Wrong settings could compromise the correct 
functioning of BLMs, collimators, and other systems. 
Work on the Management of Critical Settings is ongoing 
and a draft for functional specification has been written. 
For the start-up, such a system must be in place.  
Access to equipment via the controls system will not be 
as easy as for other CERN accelerators in the past, due to 
the large risk. The separation of technical network and 
office network is a clear progress and the first step. A 
strategy for accessing equipment via the network, 
from inside and outside CERN, is required. 
Machine protection systems will be required for the 
different operational stages. Not everything is required for 
day one, but most systems should become available when 
accelerating 156 bunches per beam. A follow-up should 
ensure that the protection systems are ready when 
they are required.   
The commissioning of the Beam Dumping System 
requires other systems to be operational, such as beam 
monitors (BPMs, Screens, BLMs), collimators (TCDQ & 
TCS in IR6, other collimators). It is important that 
everyone is aware and understands the implications 
for the Beam Dumping System. Colleagues from several 
groups are concerned, RF, BI, CO, ATB, etc.  
Although the calculated cleaning efficiency improved 
with respect to the last workshop, operation of LHC will 
be strongly affected by cleaning efficiency. The allowed 
beam intensity during operation at a certain stage will be 
limited to survive high loss rates without quench. An 
increase in the allowed beam intensity will be obtained by 
improving the machine (lifetime, orbit etc.) and the 
collimation system (more jaws, tighter gaps etc.). 
There is a factor of 1000 in cleaning efficiency with 
respect to other machines – we must be prepared to 
learn with beam.  
A simplification for the early operation is to use fewer 
jaws, and/or with relaxed collimator settings, then bring 
up the complex system in steps.  
The commissioning of the collimation system must be 
done in a controlled way with good beam conditions. 
During the early operation it only requires beam loss 
monitors at collimators and some few other locations. 
Operation of the beam cleaning system requires a 
powerful controls system. Collimator positions are 
critical and must be managed accordingly. 
Sophisticated controls for the collimators are required, 
and software to optimise setting-up procedures.  
For each operational stage, operational settings are 
known, maximum allowed settings of collimators for 
machine protection need to be worked out in detail. 
The Beam Loss Monitor System (detectors, electronics 
etc.) is expected to be operational before beam. The 
commissioning and operational scenarios must be 
further developed. 
Formalised procedures, documented and approved, for 
machine protection systems is required for different 
stages. This is successfully being done for Hardware 
Commissioning, but it is important that this approach 
for beam commissioning is agreed upon and taken 
seriously. 
Operating conditions for the different commissioning 
stages have to be defined. Each system including the 
beam dumping system will be commissioned for the 
current operating conditions. A move to the next 
commissioning stage must be authorized. Testing and 
acceptance procedures and required state for the next 
stage e.g. "beam dumping system ready for 43 on 43" etc. 
have to be defined. 
Operation of the LHC will be strongly confined by 
machine protection issues. Therefore integration of the 
commissioning for Machine Protection Systems into 
general beam operation is required, by close 
collaboration between machine protection experts and 
operation / commissioning team.  
The creation of a Machine Protection Coordination 
Team is proposed. Do we agree that such team would be 
useful, and what would be the mandate? How could the 
activities of such team be integrated into operation? 
Today, commissioning is mainly discussed in two 
working groups, LHC-OP and MPWG, both reporting to 
LTC. The organisation of LHC beam commissioning 
should be revisited, aiming at an improved integration of 
machine protection commissioning and general LHC 
commissioning.  
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